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The Case of the Lonely Nurse: The Wife's
Action for Loss of Consortium
"[Als a proximate result of the defendants' negligence, [the plaintiff] . . .
has been transformed 'from a loving wife into a lonely nurse . . . ""*
N DECEMBER 1965, an Ohio common pleas court announced its
willingness in Clem v. Brown1 to allow a wife to bring an action
for loss of the consortium of her husband resulting from the de-
fendant's negligent operation of his automobile. An action for loss
of consortium is uniformly allowed to a woman when a defendant
has intentionally interfered with the marriage relationship.' But
most courts have bristled at attempts to bring this action where in-
jury to the marriage has arisen through a defendant's negligent, as
opposed to his willful, conduct.3 In overruling the defendant's de-
murrer, the court in Clem v. Brown4 challenged Ohio's historic posi-
tion opposing this action, basing its stand upon the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Paulding County Com-
mon Pleas Court was not alone in this move; a visible trend toward
allowing an action for negligent invasion of the marital relationship
has been discernible in this country since 1950.' Nevertheless, al-
though the trend exemplified by the holding in the Clem decision
has been cited in at least three recent Ohio cases,' other judges have
continued to sustain defendants' demurrers. Obviously, a common
pleas decision cannot be regarded as strong enough authority to
change Ohio's opposition to the action; however, it does appear that
Ohio's lawyers and courts are considering the problem.
I. THE MEANING OF CONSORTIUM
Consortium has been defined variously, "sometimes in terms
enormously complex as the judges followed the habit of lawyers of
never using one word where 2 may be employed."7  The essence
*Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 84, 215 A.2d 1, 2 (1965).
13 Ohio Misc. 167, 207 N.E.2d 398 (C.P. 1965).
227 AM. JuR. Husband and Wife § 513 (1940).
3Id. § 514.
4 3 Ohio Misc. 167, 207 N.E.2d 398 (C.P. 1965).
5 See Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 88, 215 A.2d 1,
4 (1965) and cases cited therein.
6 Simms v. Shannon, Civil No. 829103, Ohio C.P., May 24, 1966; Marks v. Berto-
vich, Civil No. 822199, Ohio C.P., Dec. 11, 1965; Clement v. Schleuther, Civil No.
798279, Ohio C.P., May 26, 1964.
7 Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 35, 101 N.W.2d 227, 228 (1960).
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of consortium is the mutual right of a husband and wife to the so-
ciety, companionship, comfort, and affection of one another.8 It
represents the fellowship of husband and wife - the right of each
to the company of the other in every conjugal relation.' In modern
parlance it is probably what Madison Avenue wags would term
"togetherness." However, whereas the word "togetherness" is in-
discriminately applied to all family relationships, consortium is a
right which arises from, and is peculiar to, marriage." It is not
a euphemism for sexual relations, although some courts do include
this element in the definition." More accurately, consortium is con-
cerned with the sentimental elements of the marital relationship -
that constellation of companionship, dependence, reliance, affection,
sharing, and aid which are legally recognizable, protected rights
arising out of the civil contract of marriage.' Courts variously in-
clude or exclude from the penumbra of consortium the idea of
services, i.e., the contribution of the wife's physical labor to the
smooth and efficient running of the household and rearing of the
children.'" Both in England and in the United States, the husband's
action for loss of consortium was based upon the understanding that
his legal obligation to support his wife was balanced by her obliga-
tion to serve him.'4 The two obligations, parallel but not reciprocal,
arose as a natural consequence of the civil contract into which the
two parties had entered. Because of the emphasis placed upon the
wife's obligation to serve, early common law jurists were able to
defend the sanctity of the family by finding an analogy between the
husband-wife relationship and the master-servant relationship. In
England, any interference with the status and relationship of the
parties to a contract was frowned upon as long ago as the fifteenth
century."8 Thus, early courts had no difficulty in sustaining the
cause of a husband who claimed interference with a right of the
marriage contract. The husband had a "quasi-proprietary interest"
8 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
852 (1950).
9 28 OHIo JuR. 2D Husband and Wife § 7 (1958).
' Pyle v. Waechter, 202 Iowa 695, 701, 210 N.W. 926, 929 (1926) (dictum).
11Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965)
(by implication).
2 Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912).
13 Note, Judicidal Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61. COLUM. L.
REV. 1341, 1343 (1961).
14 HARPER & SKOLNICK, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 11 (1962).
15PROSSER, TORTS 723 (2d ed. 1955).
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in his wife'6 just as he had in his servant. The wife's interest in
the marriage, however, was never afforded similar protection.
H.. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSORTIUM ACTION
The paternalistic view of the husband's right to his wife's ser-
vices, without a corresponding right in the wife, appears to have had
its origin in ancient Roman law." A Roman woman, the daughter
of a citizen, could marry sine mana or cam manu - manus being
the power of the husband over the wife."8 A woman married sine
mana remained subject to her father's control all her life, but when
a woman married cam mana, her person and her possessions were
transferred to the authority of her husband or her father-in-law."9
The power of the father, patria potestas, or the power of the hus-
band, manas, meant literally the power of life or death over the
woman.
20
A. Women Under Roman Law
In the early days of the Republic (508-202 B.C.), the husband
alone possessed legal rights. He alone could buy, sell, or hold prop-
erty, or enter a contract." Furthermore, only the pater-familias
could bring an action if the wife had been injured or harmed, be-
cause she was so identified with him as to make the wrong done to
her as if it were done to him.22 During this period, the Roman ma-
tron was unable to appear in court, even as a witness or to claim
dower rights in her husband's estate.E Her lot did improve, how-
ever, as the Republic progressed and the Empire appeared.24 One
writer believes that by the dose of the Empire period, the Roman
woman had gained many legal rights but that she was clever enough
to conceal her freedom under the guise of continuing legal disabili-
ties.25 Nevertheless, whether or not she engaged in pretense, '"The
16 Id. at 683.
-
7 Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 651 (1931).
18 DURANT, CAESAR AND CHRIST 68 (1944).
I ibid.
2 0 GAIJs, ELEMENTS Op ROMAN LAw 94 (2d ed. Poste transl. 1875). If a woman
committed a crime, her husband or her father could sentence her to death. Ibid.
21 DURANT, op. cit. supra note 18, at 57.
2 2 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 15, at 723.
23 DURnANr, op. cit. supra note 18, at 57.
2 4 Id. at 223-24, 396.
25 Ibid.
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law of the Republic assumed that she was never sui iuris, 'of her own
right,' but always dependent upon some male guardian ....
B. The Common Law View of Consortium
Legally, married women were as non-existent under the com-
mon law as their Roman sisters. Like the Roman matron, the early
English lady was understood as being one with her husband; 7 as a
consequence, her "very being and existence [was] suspended during
coverture or entirely merged or incorporated into that of her hus-
band. ' 28 It was long understood that if injuries were inflicted upon
the wife, harm was done the husband in the same way that damages
were sustained by the master when violence was inflicted upon his
servant. Blackstone explained the analogy of husband and wife to
master and servant by observing: "IThe inferior hath no kind of
property in the company, care, or assistance of the superior, as the
superior is held to have in those of the inferior; and therefore the
inferior can suffer no loss or injury."29
Like the patria potestas and manus of the old Romans, the com-
mon law authority of husband over wife was absolute. By mar-
riage, a husband acquired absolute tide to all her personal property,
the right to reduce her choses in action to possession, and the right
to collect the rents and profits of her real estate."0 Just as her
property became her husband's, so the product of her labor became
exclusively his. The logic of the legal inferiority of women was
explained by Sir Thomas Smith in The Book of the Commonwealth
of England. Husband and wife each had their role to play -
the man to get, to travel abroad and to defend; the wife to
serve, to stay at home and to distribute that which is gotten, for
the nurture of the children and family: which to maintain, God
hath given the man the greater wit, better strength, better courage,
to compel our women to obey, by reason or force.3'
Mention has been made of the correspondence which the com-
mon law jurists found between the master-servant relationship and
the marriage relationship. Prohibiting interference with the status
of master and servant was an early concern of the common law. 2
26 Id. at 396.
27 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442 (Christian ed. 1807).
282 id. at *433.
293 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143 (Lewis ed. 1897).
30 Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129 (1872).
31 Quoted in BINGHAM, INFANCY AND COVERTURE 184 (1849).
32PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 15, at 723.
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Similarly, very early in the history of the common law, an action
could be brought against one who had interfered with the relation-
ship between husband and wife. In the quaint English, quasi-
French, Latin legal jargon of 1618, there is reported a tort action
for battery against one Livesey for harming Guy's wife. The de-
fendant's act was said to have deprived le baron of the company and
comfort "que un feme [sicl port a sa baron.""3  The brief opinion
has a plaintive tenor from which the reader might infer that the
justice's opinion was founded upon a marsh of sympathy rather than
upon firm legal ground.
The first mention of the husband's legal right to the comfort of
his wife was made almost fifty years later in Hyde v. Scyssor."4
Error was assigned by the defendant for allowing a husband to bring
a trespass action without joining his injured wifeY The court held
that no error existed because the action was not for battery to the
wife but for loss and damage suffered by the plaintiff-husband for
want of "her company and aid." 6  That the wife might suffer
similarly from a deprivation of her husband's company and aid must
never have occurred to the common law judges who labored under
the fiction of the conceptual legal unity of the pair.
One might have expected this concept of unity to have travelled
from the King's Bench27 to the ecclesiastical courts which coexisted
in England during those centuries when the early common law was
developing."8 Curiously, however, in the view of the ecclesiastical
courts, husband and wife were two separate entities. Recognition
of this non-identity can probably be attributed to the civil law upon
which ecclesiastical law was founded,"9 as under the civil law hus-
bands and wives possessed separate estates and could make separate
contracts, undertake separate debts and obligations, and suffer sepa-
rate personal injuries. Women therefore could sue and be sued in
their own names.4" These courts, concerned with the spirituality
and morality of man, had jurisdiction over matters such as defama-
-
3 Guy v. Livesey, 2 Rolls 51, 81 Eng. Rep. 653 (K.B. 1618).
34 2 Croke Rep. 538, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (K.B. 1620).
3 5 Battery was the one action which required the joining of the wife. PROSSER, op.
cit. supra note 15, at 690.
36 Hyde v. Scyssor, 2 Croke Rep. 538, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (K.B. 1620).
37 CARTnR, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH COURTS 41 (6th ed. 1935). By 1272,
the King's Bench, the Exchequer, and the Common Bench were in existence and were
developing the common law. Id. at 41-42.
3 8 Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621, 626 (1878).
39 Ibid.
40 Id. at 627.
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tion of character and, most importantly, marriage. Five distinct
causes of action could be brought in the spiritual courts,41 of which
one was a suit for restitution of conjugal rights.42 Thus, when a
wife entered, alleging loss of consortium because her husband had
been enticed away from her by his family, she might emerge with
her husband restored to her, the oddity of the relief being attributed
to the fact that ecclesiastical courts could not award damages to
make whole the aggrieved plaintiff but could restore the very thing
of which the wife had been deprived.4"
Despite the example of the spiritual courts, the common law
courts remained unmoved and persisted in allowing the cause of
action to the husband alone on the basis of interference with
his rights arising out of the marriage contract. "TIThis unsatisfac-
tory state of the common law"44 existed, in part, undoubtedly be-
cause a wife's services to the household were capable of being esti-
mated in money, whereas the value of the wife's society was too
ethereal to be assessed. Thus, we see later cases fixing more and
more upon the idea of service rather than society in awarding com-
pensation in the husbands' actions.4"
Not until 1861 did either English or American courts entertain
the notion that loss of comfort and aid was not too vague to be
measured and that possibly a cause of action for loss of consortium
might be allowed to the wife. In Lynch v. Knight,4" the possibility
was indeed entertained - and promptly discarded. Mrs. Lynch
sued Knight for making defamatory statements about her which had
caused her husband to send her away from his home and back to
her parents. Lord Wensleydale held fast to the accepted position
that the only loss capable of measurement was one in which the
husband was deprived of the "assistance of the wife in the conduct
of the household.., and in the education of the children., 47  With
the classical instinct of a lord to the manor born, Wensleydale be-
lieved that the amount of compensation for the wife's services would
be dependent upon the position of husband and wife in society. 8
41 Id. at 626.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 1d. at 631.
45 See -innant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 124, 126 S.E. 307, 309
(1925) ; Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 103, 112 N.E. 204, 205 (1915).
469 H.L. 577, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (K.B. 1861).
47Id. at 598, 11 Eng. Rep. at 863.
48 Ibid.
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The more interesting opinion, and the one which legal scholars
often cite as the opening shot in the reluctant war that courts were
to wage in behalf of the wife, is Lord Campbell's.49 Campbell
ventured that the action for consortium might lie, but his pronounce-
ment was timid and tentative, and the cause of Lynch did not pre-
vail." The case, however, is important as a beginning.
C. The Help of the Married Women's Acts
In the 1840's, women received another boost to their cause when
many jurisdictions began to promulgate the Emancipation or Mar-
ried Women's Acts.51 By these acts, the legal unity of husband and
wife under the common law was severed; thereafter, a married
woman acquired the right to sue, to be sued, to contract, and to own
and control property as well as the dubious right of being able to
commit a tort without having her husband considered the tort-
feasor due to his legal "oneness" with her.5
After passage of these acts, cases of first impression began to
appear wherein wives recovered for loss of consortium when an
intentional interference with their marital relationship occurred. 3
One defendant, bewildered by being sued for a tort which hitherto
had had no definition in the legal lexicon, was chastised by the
judge: "'It is said such an action as this was never brought before
.... I wish never to hear this objection again."" The decision
assented to the observation that the protean imagination of man
can invent countless torts which have never been recognized before
by the courts but which are nonetheless actionable.55 Calling for a
new application of legal principles regarding married women, Clark
v. Harlan56 acknowledged the defendant's liability in damages for
having enticed away the plaintiff's husband and causing her to lose
his companionship as well as the services which he rendered in
taking care of her property interests. This attempt to inject the
4 9 Id. at 589, 11 Eng. Rep. at 859.
Old. at 601, 11 Eng. Rep. at 864.
51 PROssER, op. cit. supra note 15, at 672.
52 Ibid. See also Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH.
L R v. 1 (1923).
531d. at 4; Eliason v. Draper, 25 Del. 1, 77 At!. 572 (1910); Sims v. Sims, 79
N.J.L. 577, 76 At. 1063 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910); Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584,
23 NE. 17 (1889).
54 Clark v. Harlan, 13 Ohio Dec. Reprint 634 (Cinc. Super. Ct. 1871) (quoting
Chapman v. Pickersgill, 2 Wills. 145, 95 Eng. Rep. 734 (K.B. 1762)).
55 Id. at 634-35.
56 13 Ohio Dec. Reprint 634, 636 (Cinc. Super. Ct. 1871).
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element of the husband's services was interesting but not successful.
It was not for loss of her husband's services that Mrs. Clark recov-
ered; rather, recovery was granted because the court thought it
illogical, under the new emancipation acts, to secure a wife's right
to claim a separate estate, for example, and yet deny her the right
to recover for a personal injury.57
D. The Reluctant Authorization of a Remedy for Intentional
Interference
From this rather insignificant beginning, recovery for inten-
tional interference with the marital relationship began to receive
some judicial support. A few years after the Clark case, a husband,
giving credence to his father's opinion of his wife, hauled her seven
miles in a small wagon and installed her unceremoniously in a small
tenement house. The court, in Westlake v. Westlake, " permitted
the outraged wife to sue her father-in-law, determining that the
benefit which the wife has in the consortium of the husband was
said to equal that which the husband had in the wife.59
The recoveries occurring after 1861 emanated from suits pro-
testing intentional intrusion in the relation between man and wife.
A wife could recover for enticement," for alienation of affections,"1
and for criminal conversation.62 An Ohio case, distinguished by
the pathos of its facts, awarded damages to a wife for loss of the
consortium of her husband, a morphine addict."3 The wife alleged
and proved that the defendant druggist had repeatedly sold the drug
to her husband despite her entreaties not to supply him.64 Other
cases, in which liquor was furnished to alcoholic husbands, resulted
in similar awards of damages.65
The development of the cause of action in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries was a time for exploring the meaning
of the Married Women's Acts. On the one hand, an oft-cited rea-
son for denying the consortium action where negligence was pre-
sented was that the acts gave women no new rights but merely
57 1bid.
58 34 Ohio St. 621 (1878).
59 Id. at 633.
60 Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889).
61 Hart v. Knapp, 76 Conn. 135, 55 Ad. 1021 (1903).
62 Nieburg v. Cohen, 88 Vt. 281, 92 At. 214 (1914).
63 Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912).
64 Ibid.
65 See, e.g., Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940).
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allowed them to bring, in their own names, actions for those rights
which had existed at common law.6" Just as frequently, the reason
given for allowing the action to women was that the emancipation
acts removed all legal disabilities and gave women a new legal free-
dom. 07  One judge in Ohio remarked jubilantly that the only free-
dom now denied women was suffrage.6" Surely the judges of that
period who allowed the action must often have regarded themselves
as knights of old, doing battle for ladies in distress. Yet no matter
how enthusiastically some courts might wax over the new freedom
of women, the cause of action for invasion of the consortium right
was still limited to intentional or malicious injury. Only in a few
dissenting opinions 9 and in two cases, quickly overturned, 0 was
there any indication of a contrary persuasion. Denial of the cause
of action was characteristically based upon five major premises.
First, it was said if the legislature had wished to permit the action,
it would have written an appropriate statute;7 second, since the in-
jury was suffered by the husband, the consequences to the wife were
too remote and unforeseeable to be compensable;72 third, if damages
were awarded to the husband, the consortium lost by the wife was
undoubtedly calculated into the husband's award by the jury;7 and
fourth, the emancipation acts gave married women no new rights. "
Finally, where all else failed, the old common law argument was
advanced that a wife suffered no compensable injury in the loss of
her husband's consortium because she suffered no loss of services
- services being the distinctly distaff contribution to the marital
relation.75
66 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 816 & n.30 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 852 (1950).6 7 Holbrook, supra note 52, at 4-5.
6 8 Griffen v. Cincinnati Realty Co., 27 Ohio Dec. 585, 589 (Cinc. Super. Ct. 1913).
09 See, e.g., dissenting opinions in Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 632-42, 208
S.W. 462, 467-70 (1918); Landwehr v. Barbas, 241 App. Div. 769, 270 N.Y. Supp.
534, aff'd without opinion, 270 N.Y. 537, 200 N.E. 306 (1934).
7 OHipp v. E. I. Dupont deNemours & Co., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.B 318 (1921), over-
ruled by Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925); Grif-
fen v. Cincinnati Realty Co., 27 Ohio Dec. 585 (Cinc. Super. Ct. 1913), overruled by
Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 NE. 204 (1915).
71 See, e.g., Hipp v. E. I. Dupont deNemours & Co., supra note 70, at 14-15, 108 S.B.
at 320-21 (by implication).
72 Cf. id. at 18, 108 S.E. at 322 for a discussion of these grounds.
73 Feneff v. New York Cent. & H-R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 281, 89 N.E. 436, 437
(1909); Sheard v. Oregon Elec. Ry., 137 Ore. 341, 343-44, 2 P.2d 916, 917 (1931).
74 See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 816 & n.30 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 852 (1950).
75See Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. 577, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (K.B. 1861) for the proto-
type of this argument.
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III. THE HITAFFER THRUST
In 1950, a federal court suddenly indicated its regret over prior
decisions which had refused to allow the wife to sue 6 and called
for a change of attitude in the courts' handling of the problem."
Methodically, Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.78 set up all the reasons which
had been advanced for denying the consortium action, and with
corresponding precision the court struck down the arguments which
had been offered immediately after the emancipation acts as well as
those which developed along the way to Hitaffer."9 Initially, there
were cases, such as Marri v. Stamford St. Ry.,8° which divide the
concept of consortium into distinct elements: for example, love, com-
panionship, sexual relations, affection, and material service." The
posture is recognizable as that advanced by Lynch v. Knight.82
Courts which reason in this way, the Hitaffer court believed, had
been trapped by a rhetorical habit of common law pleading into
using two words where one would suffice.83 When both loss of
services and loss of conjugal affection were pleaded, "no distinct
functions were intended."84 - Consequently, because consortium is a
conceptualistic unity, courts commit error whenever loss of one or
another of the elements is distinguished. "[Tlhere can be no ra-
tional basis for holding that in negligent invasions suability depends
on whether there is a loss of services."8  It is rather the injury to
the unity of consortium that matters.
A second group of cases,8" exemplified by Bernhardt v. Perry,7
76Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852
(1950).
77Id. at 819.
78 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
79 See text accompanying notes 44-68 supra.
8084 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911).
81 See, e.g., Bolger v. Boston Elevated R.R., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910).
For an excellent discussion, see Gueuin v. Manchester St. Ry., 78 N.H. 289, 99 Ad. 298
(1916).
829 H.L. 577, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (K.B. 1861). See also text accompanying note 75
supra.
83 183 F.2d at 813-14.
841d. at 813.
85 Id. at 814.
86 See, e.g., Giggey v. Gallagher Transp. Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100 (1937);
Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935); Tobiassen v. Polley,
96 N.J.L 66, 114 Ad. 153 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
87276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1919), appea2 dismissed, 254 U.S. 662 (1920),
overruled by Novack v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 532, 539 (Mo. 1963).
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also emphasizes the element of services in defining consortium.
These cases assert that where the husband has sued in his own right
for personal injury, an element of his damage award compensates
him for any impairment of his faculties and obligations,88 and that
therefore any separate recovery by the wife for loss of consortium
would pose a risk of double recovery. Perhaps the origin of this
view lies in a classic article on consortium by Roscoe Pound,89 who
wrote in 1916:
[Ojur modes of trial are such and our mode of assessment of
damages by the verdict of a jury is... so crude that if husband
and wife were each allowed to sue, instead of each recovering an
exact reparation, each would be pretty sure to recover what would
repair the injury to both.90
The Hitaffer opinion, admitting the possibility of a double recovery,
counsels that the husband's recovery must be taken into account
when measuring the wife's damages and points to the court's power
to apportion damages as a means of avoiding the problem.9"
A third group of cases 2 refuses to allow the wife's action on the
ground that her injury is not a direct, foreseeable consequence of
the defendant's negligence. Such arguments fail for two reasons,
according to the Hitaffer court. First, the wife's injury is a direct
consequence of the husband's injury."3 Second, if one follows the
logic of these courts, on what foundation do they lay recovery when
the husband has been intentionally injured?94 Is not the same area
of the marital relation affected?
Hitaffer addresses itself to the problem of refuting cases which
hold, as did Brown v. Kistleman," that the Married Women's Acts
substantiated women's property rights and that the marital relation-
ship, being neither a property right nor a right arising out of a con-
tract of bargain or sale, is not within their protective bounds. 6
Viewing this attitude as archaic, Hitaffer espouses a modern rule:
88 276 Mo. at 629, 208 S.W. at 466.
89 Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177
(1916).
90 Id. at 194.
91 183 F.2d at 819.
92See, e.g., Boden v. DeI-Mar Garage, Inc., 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933);
Feneff v. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909); Smith v.
Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915).
93 183 F.2d at 815.
94 Id. at 817.
9r 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912).
96 183 F.2d at' 815.
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the husband's right to the conjugal society of his wife is not a prop-
erty right nor is it greater than the wife's right. The rights are
equal and must receive the equal protection of the law. 7
All of the cases which it examined and rejected, the Hitaffer
opinion claims, are instances of indulgence in "legalistic gymnas-
tics,"98 and the court would not countenance the incongruity of the
policies expressed by them.99
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF HITAFFER:
A MEAGER CROP
No dramatic revolution in legal thinking occurred after Hitaffer.
The court was criticized sharply by a writer discussing the impact of
insurance upon damage awards for personal injury."00 "The recent
case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co. is another instance where decision
is made to turn on a series of fashionable propositions 0' quite di-
vorced from their function in the current scene."'0 2  The writer
observed that the law often permits distinctions to be drawn be-
tween willful and negligent interference and that a social purpose
exists in protecting an individual against malicious injury which in-
flicts a more serious blow upon the individual.' Countering this
argument, a student writer' indicated that where there is malicious
interference with the marital relation, there are also grounds for
divorce in which lies an opportunity to start a new life, whereas a
physical disability suffered by a spouse never affords an opportunity
to start anew. Instead, in serious cases, the wife is often charged
with the lifelong duty of nursing an invalid.' 5
The first state to follow the lead of Hitaffer was Georgia. In
1953, Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc.,'0 reprinted the
Hitaffer decision almost in its entirety and concluded that Georgia
97 Id. at 816.
98 Ibid.
9 9 ibid.
loo Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 219, 228-31 (1953).
101 Presumably the writer means the fashionable propositions of emancipation and
equality.
0
2
oJaffe, supra note 100, at 229. (Footnotes omitted.)
103 Ibid.
104 Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 COLUM. L.
REv. 1341 (1961).
105 Id. at 1354.
10688 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953).
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was going to change its holdings in the consortium area so as to be
consistent with "this day when human rights are on the tongues"' 7
of every man, woman, and child. The very existence of civilization
depends upon whether fundamental human rights survive, and with
characteristic Southern chivalry, the Georgia court determined to en-
force the right of the wife, which was based upon the "sacred rela-
tionship of marriage."' '  In overturning past decisions, the court
felt it was not disregarding the Married Women's statutes but
merely interpreting the law in a manner compatible with the de-
mands and developments of contemporary civilization.0 9
Slowly, case by case, various jurisdictions have arrived at similar
conclusions. Seven years after Hitaffer, only five states allowed
wives to recover for loss of consortium."0  Arkansas noted that
where other states had felt constrained to deny the action because of
the rigidity of the common law, it was the very capacity of the
common law to grow and develop as new conditions arose which
made it possible for Arkansas to change its law."'
By 1961, several additional states had granted wives the right to
bring the action."' Michigan joined the group with an animated
opinion by Justice Smith who commented that consortium had been
defined until the dictionary had run dry."' "[Liet some scoundrel
dent a dishpan in the family kitchen," he noted, "and the law, in all
its majesty, will convene the court . . . and . . . suffer a jury of
her peers to assess the damages."" 4  Her right to the undisturbed
consortium of her husband was surely worthy of equal protection.
'The obstacles to the wife's action were judge-invented and they are
107Id. at 533, 77 S.E.2d at 32.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953); Missouri-Pacific Transp.
Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee
Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953); Acuff v. Schmidt, 248 Iowa 272,
78 N.W.2d 480 (1956); Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955).
'1'AMssouri-Pacific Transp. Co. v. Miller, supra note 110, at 358-59, 299 S.W.2d
at 46.
112 See, e.g., Daffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont 1961);
Dini v. Naiditch, 20 IMI. 2d 406, 170 N.E2d 881 (1960); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359
Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); Hoekstra v. Helgelund, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d
669 (1959). Cf. Mariani v. Nanni, 95 -I. 153, 185 A.2d 119 (1962).
1 3 Montgomery v. Stephan, supra note 112, at 36, 101 N.W.2d at 228.
1 4 Id. at 48-49, 101 N.W.2d at 234.
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herewith judge-destroyed.""' 5  Dini v. Naiditch"6 called the double-
recovery bogey a convenient clich6 for denying the wife's action."'
In 1966, the trend was sufficiently established for the American Bar
Association Journal to note it .8 and commend the action of New
Jersey in following the trend in Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp.
of America."9 Ekalo is another carefully constructed decision which
goes through the litany of reasons offered by other courts for deny-
ing the action. The court resolved the problem of double recovery
by requiring joinder of the husband's and wife's actions and relied
on the court's power of remittitur to prevent unduly large recov-
eries. 2 ° The court dispelled the fears which have been expressed
by some jurisdictions that the action would extend to other mem-
bers of the family.' The husband-wife relation is a special one,
the court observed, and it is not logical to expand recovery to any
other family member.' 2
V. THE OHIO SEESAW
Ohio has a long history of indecision regarding the action for
loss of consortium. Very soon after the passage of the Married
Women's Act, 2 ' the action was allowed for intentional injury. 24
Shortly thereafter came Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 25 a unique decision
in that it was the first case allowing the wife to sue for the injury she
sustained by the furnishing of a drug to her addicted husbandY.
In 1913, Griffen v. Cincinnati Realty Co.'27 attempted to permit
an action for a negligent injury to the plaintiff's husband. It was
alleged that the plaintiff had nursed and cared for her husband for a
period of fifteen weeks and that she found it necessary to give
115 Id. at 49, 101 N.W.2d at 235.
11620 IIl. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
117 Id. at 427, 101 N.E.2d at 891.
118 Rossman & Allen, What's New in the Law: Husband and Wife ... Consortium,
52 A.B.A.J. 492 (1966).
11946 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965).
120 Id. at 91-93, 215 A.2d at 6-7.
121 Id. at 92, 215 A.2d at 6-7.
122 Ibid.
1367 Ohio Laws 111 (1870) (now OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.09) and 84 Ohio
Laws 132 (1887) (now OHIO REV. CODE §§ 3103.01-.08).
124 See authorities cited note 53 supra.
125 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912). See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
126 Ibid.
127 15 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 123 (Super. Ct. 1913).
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up her job as a seamstress. 2 ' By reason of the defendant's negligence,
she alleged, she had suffered the loss of her husband's society, com-
panionship, and conjugal affection.'29 "[Tlhere has been a gradual
emancipation of married women since Blackstone's... day,"' ° the
decision stated, concluding that to disallow the action would consti-
tute a disregard of legislative intent and a retrogression to the an-
tiquated doctrine of Blackstone.' "We are not so jealous of the
privileges bestowed upon husbands by the common law, nor so in-
sensible of the spirit of the times, as to adopt such views."'82
Such militancy as would have done proud the most ardent suf-
fragette was short-lived in Ohio. Two years later, Smith v. Nicholas
Bldg. Co., 3' was handed down, becoming the leading case in this
area. The owner of an office building was charged with the careless
operation of an elevator, causing serious injury to the plaintiff's
husband. 8 ' Her husband, she alleged, had become nervous, irrita-
ble, morose, and ill-tempered, and was getting worse." 5 The court
posed the issue: Has the wife a right of action against a person for
the loss of consortium of her husband caused by personal injuries
sustained by him through the negligence of such person? 8  The
resounding reply was in the negative.' The opinion moved up
the customary artillery. There had been no loss of services by the
wife; there had been no right to bring the action at common law;
nor was there a statute conferring the right. The husband was enti-
tled to full compensation for the injury received and for any diminu-
tion in his earning capacity. Indirectly, his wife and children would
be benefited. The right of recovery should be remedial, not puni-
tive.' 88
For fifty years all indecision ceased while Ohio followed the
Smith case. In the face of this steadfast position, the common
pleas opinion by Judge Hitchcock in Clem v. Brown 89 startled
1281d. at 125.
129Id. at 126.
180 Id. at 127.
13, Id. at 128.
182 Ibid.
133 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915).
184 Id. at 102, 112 N.E. at 204-05.
1351d. at 102, 112 N.E. at 205.
136Id. at 103, 112 NE. at 205.
137 Id. at 108, 112 N.E. at 206.
138 Id. at 107, 112 N.E. at 205 (by implication).
139 3 Ohio Misc. 167, 207 N.E.2d 398 (C.P. 1965).
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many lawyers. The original petition contained the allegation of
loss of consortium at the very end - almost as an afterthought.14
The court sustained every demurrer of the defendant but refused to
strike the allegation of loss of consortium."4 There followed an
opinion by Judge Hitchcock in which he acknowledged that he
would be compelled to sustain the motion to strike if he were to
follow Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co." but that he perceived his oath
of office to require him to apply prevailing precedents of justice to
concrete cases.'4' Numerous recent cases were then cited in which
the fourteenth amendment has been reinterpreted and applied to
situations which had previously been held not to lie within its pro-
tective language. Reynolds v. Sims,'" Griffin v. Maryland,4' Esco-
bedo v. Illinois,'" and Malloy v. Hogan,4 ' were said to exemplify
this use of the fourteenth amendment. Judge Hitchcock concluded
that if the protection of the fourteenth amendment can be expanded
to shield criminals, it is no less available to Ohio's virtuous wives.'48
Conceding that Ohio precedent is contrary to his decision and that
other courts have viewed the matter as one for legislative attention,
Judge Hitchcock held that Ohio precedent and the Ohio Constitu-
tion must yield to the supreme law of the land - the United States
Constitution.
Ironically, although Mrs. Clem won the battle, she lost the war;
the Clems lost their suit for negligence by a jury veridct."50 Motions
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial were
both denied by Judge Hitchcock.' 5' As a result, the opportunity to
140 Petition of Plaintiff, p. 5, Clem v. Brown, 3 Ohio Misc. 167, 207 N.E.2d 398
(C.P. 1965).
141 Journal Entry, May 11, 1965, Clem v. Brown, supra note 140.
1493 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915).
143 3 Ohio Misc. at 171, 207 N.E.2d at 400.
144 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (legislative reapportionment required by the fourteenth
amendment).
145 378 U.S. 130 (1964) (equal protection to persons of different races wishing to
enter an amusement park).
146 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (equal protection extended to criminal suspects in regard
to services of a lawyer).
147 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (requiring the protection of the fifth amendment to be ap-
plied to the states via the fourteenth amendment).
148 3 Ohio Misc. at 171, 207 N.E.2d at 400.
149 Id. at 173, 207 N.E.2d at 402.
150 Journal Entry, Oct. 13, 1965, Clem v. Brown, 3 Ohio Misc. 167, 207 N.E.2d
398 (Ohio C.P. 1965).
151 Journal Entry, Oct. 19, 1965, Clem v. Brown, supra note 150.
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review the ruling in Clem v. Brown was lost. But the opportunity
will certainly arise at some time in the near future - not only in
Ohio but in those states which remain intransigent. " '
VI. CONCLUSION
Twelve jurisdictions 53 now dearly allow women a cause of ac-
tion for loss of consortium due to negligent invasion of the marital
relationship. Ohio remains among the majority committed to the
view expressed by Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co. 54 that approval of
the action is a legislative rather than a judicial prerogative, although
the Clem case calls into question the authority of this view. Other
jurisdictions have based their refusal to grant the action on such
grounds as the fear of double recovery,'55 the remoteness of the in-
jury to the wife, " ' and the inability of courts and juries to place a
monetary value upon the sentimental elements of marriage.'
Nevertheless, a growing and militant minority of courts which
have taken up the cause of the legally offended wife have empha-
sized the paradoxical position in which women have often stood be-
fore the law. "The Constitution in enjoining the equal protection
of the laws upon States precludes irrational discrimination as be-
tween persons... in the incidence of a law.""' The securing of
legal rights to women has had a stormy history in the application of
the reasonable classification doctrine. Inevitably, reasons for classi-
fication become outmoded, but the discrimination lingers. Lucy
Stoner and Susan B. Anthony are ludicrous figures in American folk
lore, yet they exemplify the struggle for reform. Suggestions for
change have often been met with disbelief and disdain; they then
152 This would include all state jurisdictions not specifically, mentioned in note 153
infra.
153 I-itaffer v. Argonne Co., 183, F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852
(1950); Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961); Cooney
v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953); Missouri-Pacific Transp. Co. v. Miller,
227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88
Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881
(1960); Acuff v. Schmidt, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956); Montgomery v.
Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp.
of America, 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965); Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d
572 (1955); Mariani v. Nanni, 95 R.I. 153, 785 A.2d 119 (1962); Hoekstra v. Hel-
gelund, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959).
15493 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915).
155 See text accompanying notes 86-91 supra.
156 See text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
157 See text accompanying notes 80-85 supra.
585 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
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receive brave support from a vocal minority and may culminate in
enactments such as the Married Women's Acts, the nineteenth
amendment, and title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Al-
though by no means as vital to the legal independence of women as
this legislation, recognition of the wife's cause of action for loss of
consortium is another aspect of their long struggle for equal protec-
tion.
MARIAN F. RATNOFF
-1978 Star. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964).
